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Abstract 
Remittances can affect child nutrition in two main ways, through increased income from 
remittances and changes in time allocation within the household. It is not theoretically apparent 
how a parent migrating and sending back remittances will affect child nutrition.  Any added 
income will likely improve child nutrition by relieving any household income constraint, while 
the loss of a parent or other adult may reduce the time available to prepare food and care for 
the child.  This study uses data from Peru to find that to 3000 Soles in remittances will make up 
for a parent not being in the household. 
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Introduction 
International remittances have become an important source of income for many 
households in the developing world.  In 2009, remittances accounted for a total of 7% of GDP in 
countries defined as low income by the World Bank, up from 3% at the beginning of the 
decade1.  This is more than twice as much as foreign direct investment to low income countries 
which only accounted for 3% of GDP in 2009.  In Peru, the country of interest in this study, 
remittances were 2% relative to GDP in 2009 and were 50% the size of foreign direct investment 
and over five times as large as overseas development assistance in the same year.  Although not 
as big of a percentage as some other countries in Latin America, this is comparable in 
percentage terms to Mexico, considered a major receiver of remittances, where remittances 
were 3% of GDP in 2009.   As international remittances become a larger source of income for 
the developing world it is increasingly important to study how international migration and 
remittances affect a variety of household level outcomes.  Household level outcomes related to 
poverty, livelihood strategies, food security and other welfare indicators are of particular 
interest.  In this paper, I investigate the relationship between migration of parents and 
nutritional status of children left behind.   
Child malnutrition is a critical and enduring problem in many developing countries.  In 
2008, 45% of children under five years old in low income countries were undernourished as 
measured by height-for-age, and 28% as measured by weight-for-age according to the World 
Development Indicators put out by the World Bank.  In Peru 30% of children were 
undernourished as measured by height for age and 5% as measured by weight for age in 2005 
which is the last year with available data.  One of the primary causes of malnutrition is simply 
                                                          
1
 This number can be much higher in countries such as Haiti where it is 21% of GDP or Honduras and El 
Salvador where it is 18% and 17% respectively 
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the lack of income to buy enough food or the lack of production of sufficient food at the farm 
level.  Lack of income or food production would lead to a lack of entitlement to food which Sen 
(1999) argues is the primary cause of hunger.  As such, remittances present an opportunity for 
households to help improve child nutrition through increased income.  As indicated above, 
many households in the developing world send a migrant abroad in order to send money back, 
increasing the income available to the households.  In the case of remittances from migration, 
however, the additional income comes at a cost in terms of a household's labor and time 
endowment.  For example, if the person going abroad is a parent or caretaker for a child, this 
loss of time could have negative effects on the child, including the child’s nutrition.  Parental 
time is important for child nutrition in the time they spend preparing food, or making sure that 
the child eats food that is nutritious.  If the person who is responsible for spending time 
preparing food and caring for a child migrates away, or if another adult migrates away and the 
person responsible for caring for the child has to take up extra household or production 
activities, this can have a negative effect on child nutrition because of less time spent on those 
activities that help child nutrition (Zezza, et. al, 2011).  It may be possible to make up for this 
loss through increased income from remittances sent back to the household by a migrant.  The 
relative magnitude of these opposing effects is ambiguous and must be empirically estimated.  
The high rates of malnutrition in the developing world and the increasing contribution of 
remittances to increase household income makes the relationship between remittances and 
child nutrition an important policy area.  
Many recent studies have looked into this topic; however there has been no conclusive 
empirical answer to this question.  In this paper section 2 will give a brief review of the 
literature, section 3 will present the theoretical approach used in this study, section 4 will give 
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the empirical strategy used, section 5 will summarize the data, section 6 will present the results, 
and section 7 gives policy implications from the results and section 8 concludes.   
Literature Review 
The increasing importance of remittances to developing economies has led to increased 
attention in the literature on the effect of migration and remittances on children.  A bulk of 
these studies appears in a special issue of Food Policy in February of 2011 which contains 
multiple studies examining the effect of migration on food security.   
These studies have been mixed in terms of the direction they find remittances and 
migration to effect child nutrition.  de Brauw and Mu (2011) investigate migration and its effect 
on child nutrition in rural China.  They find that in households where the parent migrates, older 
children, between seven and twelve years old are more likely to be underweight, however this 
result does not hold if a non-parent migrates.  Although the actual caloric intake increases when 
a parent migrates, the portion of protein in a child's diet goes down.  Further, they find that 
time allocation within the household changes forcing older children to spend more time on 
chores.  Cameron and Lin (2007) also find that not having a parent in the household has a 
negative effect on short term child nutrition in Thailand.  However they find that receiving 
remittances of over $200 can help to lessen the negative effect on child nutrition.  
Other studies have found that migration has an overall positive effect on child nutrition 
indicators.  Anton (2010) finds a positive impact of remittances on short-term nutritional status 
measured by weight-for-height and weight-for-age z-scores; however he finds no impact on the 
long term nutritional indicator of height-for-age z-scores in Ecuador.  This result may be due to 
the length of time that households in the study have been receiving remittances, although that 
information was not available in the dataset that was used.   Azzarri and Zezza (2011) study the 
effect of migration on child nutrition and food security in Tajikistan, finding that migration 
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overall has a positive effect on child nutrition as measured by height-for-age z-scores.  They 
found that this was true not just for children within the household, but also for children in 
communities with large migrant populations.  This indicates that there may be some network 
effect of migration resulting in positive spillovers that affects households beyond primary 
remittance receiving households.  Carletto, et. al (2011) find that in Guatemala, child nutrition 
tends to be better in households with a migrant, although they do not differentiate between 
parent migrants and non-parent migrants. de Brauw (2011) studies migration’s effect on child 
nutrition in El Salvador during the 2008 world food price crisis.  During this crisis households 
with migrants were better able to deal with price shocks, and lessen the negative effect these 
shocks had on child nutrition.   It may be that during a time such as a food crisis the income 
constraints households face are more severe in terms of being able to buy enough food, giving 
the income effect from remittances an increased importance compared to the loss of parental 
time due to migration.     
All of these studies suggest that migration can have an effect on child nutrition both 
through income effects, and changes in household time allocation.  de Brauw and Mu (2011) 
discuss how migration typically occurs because a household expects an increase in income.  This 
allows the household to buy more or better food.  The tradeoff is that the household must make 
up for the household labor that the migrant supplied previous to migration.  If the household is 
unable to completely compensate for all of this lost labor it may have a negative effect on child 
nutrition, especially if the migrant was involved in activities directly related to child nutrition.    
One of the problems in this literature is the endogeneity between child health outcomes 
and the choice to migrate.  The choice to migrate may not be independent of a child's health 
status, and may in fact be determined in part by a child’s health or nutritional status.  For 
example, if a household has a child who has poor nutrition they may be more likely to send a 
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migrant in hopes that increased income through remittances will allow for increased food 
consumption.  If the household decides that parental time is more important to nutritional 
outcomes then they will be less likely to send a migrant.  In the first case migration will be 
correlated with lower child nutrition, while in the second case it will be correlated with higher 
child nutrition.  In both cases this correlation will be caused not by the effect of migration on 
child nutrition, but the effect of child nutrition on a household’s decision to send a migrant, 
creating a problem of endogeneity.  Only a study by Gibson, et. al (2011) has used data from a 
natural experiment which addresses this causality problem in the research design. This study 
looks at the effects of a migration lottery program on the diets of children who do and do not 
migrate. The data are of people that apply to migrate from Tonga to New Zealand.  The health 
impacts for children who stay while a household member migrates, and those who migrate with 
a parent are mixed.  Children who stay tend to have a higher prevalence of low height-for-age. 
However those who stay also have a lower prevalence of obesity, a more common problem in 
Tonga than being underweight.  This study argues that in the short term remittances may not 
enough to make up for the lost income caused by a migrant leaving for those who stay behind, 
meaning migration may actually reduce income for a household.         
 Most studies use some statistical method for dealing with endogeneity. Typically 
studies employ a two stage least squares method.  This requires identifying an instrumental 
variable that is correlated with migration but not child nutrition.  One of the most common 
instrumental variables used in the literature has been a measure of a network effect of 
migration within a community (Anton, 2010; Azzarri and Zezza, 2011; Mckenzie, 2006).  All of 
these studies use some measure of the number or proportion of migrants within the 
communities that are being studied, with the idea that having more migrants in an area will 
make it easier and more likely that others from the area will migrate.  Anton also used the 
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number of Western Unions in the area, with the assumption that more Western Unions would 
reduce the cost of sending remittances.  
Not all studies have been able to find a suitable instrumental variable and have relied on 
other statistical techniques to deal with endogeneity.  de Brauw and Mu (2011) use a fixed 
effects model, which accounts for all unobserved characteristics that do not change over time.  
They assume endogeneity is caused by unobserved characteristics that are unchanging over 
time. A model with fixed effect for the household will account for these in a way that one 
without such a fixed effect cannot.  This fixed effect model is only possible using panel data, 
over multiple years.   
In addition to an inconsistency in methods within this literature, there is an 
inconsistency in results for how migration affects child nutrition, as highlighted above.  de 
Brauw and Mu (2011) and Gibson, et. al (2011) find a negative effect of migration on child 
nutrition, while Anton (2010), Carletto, et. al (2011) and de Brauw (2010) find a positive effect of 
migration on child nutrition.  Because of this discrepancy there is room for more research within 
this area, to add to the understanding of how migration may affect children, specifically in the 
tradeoff between income and time allocation.  My study will do this using the Young Lives 
Survey from Peru, a dataset previously unused within the literature.  I will attempt to deal with 
endogeneity using a two stage least squares method similar to many other studies in the area.                
Theory  
To understand the ways in which parental migration will affect child nutrition it is 
important to understand how migration will affect both income and time allocation within the 
household.  To predict the influence of migration and remittance on child nutrition a utility 
maximizing household model is employed.  It is assumed that a household will maximize the 
utility function: 
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                                                            (1) 
similar to the household utility function found in Bardhan and Udry (1999) where l is leisure, c is 
consumption, subscripted by h for the household and m for a migrant, and CN, is child nutrition.  
Both consumption and leisure are standard in a household utility function.  We can assume that 
the entire household will benefit from having healthy children from improved child nutrition.  
Child nutrition is produced within the household and is a function of both time spent child 
rearing and the share of consumption that is spent on food for the child.  
	
  	
  ,                                                                (2) 
In equation (2),  is the amount of time spent by adults in the household on activities that 
improve child nutrition outcomes, such as educating the child on the importance of nutrition 
and the types of foods necessary to stay well nourished, and time spent preparing food for the 
children that is of high nutritional value.  Sigma is the proportion of household consumption that 
is actually food for the child.  It is assumed that an overall increase in ch will correspond with an 
increase in food for children, or that intra-household allocation of food is constant as income 
increases.  Consumption for both the household and a migrant are limited by an income 
constraint for each defined by: 
                                                                 (3) 
                                                               (4) 
where (3) represents the income constraint for those household members who stay, and 
equation (4) is the income constraint for the migrant.  Theta is the percentage of income that 
the migrant sends back to the household in the form of remittances.  An increase in remittances 
will increase the possible consumption for those who remain in the household, and decrease the 
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possible consumption for the migrant.  In addition to income constraints both the migrant and 
household have time constraints defined by: 
                                                                    (5) 
                                                                        (6) 
where (5) indicates the time constraint for the household, and (6) gives the time constraint for a 
migrant.  Time spent on child nutrition is only possible for non-migrants, while a person 
migrating will lead to a drop in Th and an increase in Tm.  All four of the income and time 
constraints can be combined into a full budget constraint:    
                                   (7) 
The optimization problem can be constructed by maximizing (1) subject to (7) and choosing 
ch,cm, lh, lm, and Lcnh.  The Lagrangian is then: 
    , ,  , , 	
   λ                     
(8)     
and the first order conditions for this problem are: 
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 From these first order conditions we see that that both household consumption (ch) and 
time spent by adults on improving child nutrition (Lcnh) affect household utility indirectly 
through child nutrition as shown in equation (9).  Household consumption also has a direct 
effect on child nutrition.  This direct, as well as indirect effect of household consumption may be 
one of the driving factors of remittances.  This is because remittances are a way of shifting 
consumption from the migrant to the household.  As we can see from equation (10) 
consumption by the migrant only has a direct effect on consumption.  Because household 
consumption has an indirect as well as direct effect on utility there may be incentive to shift 
consumption from the migrant to the household through remittances.   
 One of the key factors driving possible migration is the possibility of higher wages 
abroad.  This higher wage abroad will likely have an effect on household time allocation 
 "                                                                            (14) 
#

"
#

                                                                            (15) 
Equation (15), which follows from equation (14), shows that if the household and migrant have 
similar marginal utilities for leisure the migrant will tend to work more assuming this higher 
wage abroad. Because this added income can be sent to the household in the form of 
remittances, having a person go abroad could free up those in the household to spend a higher 
percentage of their time on leisure or improving child nutrition.  However, because migration 
leads to an overall decrease in time for the household, it is theoretically ambiguous whether this 
will lead to an absolute increase in time spent improving child nutrition.  A study by Cameron 
and Lin (2007) found that having less than two parents in a household will have a negative effect 
on a child’s short term nutritional status.  They found, however, that if the household receives 
over $200 worth of remittances in a year this can partially offset this negative effect of not 
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having a parent in the household.   This indicates that if the migrant sends enough money back 
this may allow those adults still in the household to spend less time working and more time 
improving child nutrition.  Because migration affects both household income and household 
time allocation it is theoretically ambiguous how it will affect child nutrition, for this reason it 
must be answered empirically.     
Data Description 
 For this study I will be using the Young Lives survey (YLS) from Peru, a country in which 
the effect of migration on child health has not been studied.  The YLS is a longitudinal study that 
interviewed 12,000 children across four countries (Peru, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and India) in 2002.  
For each country approximately 2,000 one year olds and 1,000 eight year olds were interviewed.  
The survey included information about the children as well as their household.  The same 
households were then interviewed four years later when the children were five and twelve 
years old.  Only the data from Peru was used for this study because they include information on 
household remittances for both rounds one and two. For Peru, in round one, the households of 
2,052 one year olds and 714 eight year olds were interviewed.   Round two was collected four 
years later, and 1,963 of the same households that had one year olds and 685 of the same 
households that had eight year olds during round one were interviewed again.  
 The data include measures of height and weight-for-age z-scores which are used as 
proxies for nutritional status.  These z-scores were calculated from the World Health 
Organization’s standards for height and weight.    Height-for-age is used as a proxy for long term 
health and weight-for-age is used as a proxy for short term health (Anton 2010).  In the data, the 
height-for-age z-scores are available for all children, while weight-for-age z-scores are not 
available for the older children during round two.  Because these z-scores are calculated using 
international standards the mean height and weight-for-age z-scores are both below 0.  This is 
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true for all age cohorts of children, although it is less for the one year olds interviewed in round 
one, as can be seen in tables 1 through 4.   
 In total there are 885 cases of households receiving remittances, combining all age 
groups.  For each of the child age groups, between 124 and 335 households receive remittances 
and across all age groups 16% of households receive remittances.  For round 2 there is also 
information on the amount of remittances that have been sent (Tables 1 and 2).  Remittance 
amounts are measured in Soles, and are calculated by taking the amount of the most recent 
remittance received and multiplying it by the number of times per year they receive 
remittances.  This is making an assumption that the last remittance received was the average 
amount the household receives.  If this is not the case this method of measuring remittances 
will be inaccurate. 
There are some basic variables on household characteristics in the data.  Each 
household is identified as urban or rural.  The majority of households are urban.  Anton (2010) 
found that children in urban areas had better nutritional outcomes than children in rural areas.  
There is also information on how many parents are in the household.  The measure used in this 
study is whether the child sees both parents, only the mother, only the father, or neither parent 
on a daily basis.  For all age groups the share of children that do not see either parent is 
relatively small, below 5%.  The percentage of children that see only their father is even smaller 
for both age cohorts within round 2, while children that only see their mother account for 
between 20 and 30% of children.  This variable can be used as a proxy for parental time, which 
should have a positive impact on child nutrition from theory.  There is also information on 
mother’s education and age, which have been shown to affect child nutrition in previous studies 
(Anton 2010).  Both of these variables will be included in as a part of the vector of household 
controls that were a part of the guiding equation. 
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 From theory, income or expenditure data should also be included as an explanatory 
variable, but expenditure data are only available in the round two survey.  This is because 
consumption is one of the determinants of child nutrition which is constrained by household 
income.  A variable for food expenditure is calculated as a proxy for income (Tables 1-4).  The 
original data has information broken down by type of food and the food expenditure combines 
all of these to create an overall expenditure. 
 Because expenditure or income data are not available for the first round of surveys 
wealth is used as a proxy.  There are examples in the literature of wealth being used instead of 
income in explaining child nutritional outcomes (Anton 2010).  The data have an overall wealth 
index that is calculated on a 0 to 1 scale for each household that is interviewed.  Included within 
this wealth index are the housing quality index, consumer durable index, and services index.  
The housing quality index takes into account the number of rooms and housing material used in 
the home of the household being interviewed.  The consumer durable index takes into account 
the ownership of various goods within the household such as radios, cars and telephones.  The 
services index measures whether the household gets electricity, where the household gets its 
water and what type of toilet the household has.  All of these are calculated on a 0 to 1 scale 
and the average of these three is the wealth index.  Both wealth and income should have a 
positive effect on child nutrition outcomes.  Because wealth is a stock concept it may not be as 
accurate in determining consumption.  Wealth as measured in the data includes many assets 
that a household might not be able to easily liquidate in order to increase food expenditure. 
Empirical Strategy 
 First, a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model using data from the round two 
survey is estimated.  The basic form of the OLS regression will be: 
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where Z are a list of household and child level control.  This OLS regression will be run using only 
data from the round two survey because some relevant variables were only included in the 
round two survey.  The variables that round one is missing include household expenditure and 
remittance amounts.  For round one the data only indicated whether the household received 
remittances and did not indicate the amount of remittances received.  In addition, only wealth 
indices were available.  No information on income or expenditure was collected.  In order to 
include the theoretically important remittance amounts and expenditure it is necessary to only 
use round two of the survey in a cross-sectional analysis.   
 Using a standard OLS model is potentially problematic given that it may not account for 
endogeneity and cause parameter estimates to be biased.  As a result one of the key 
assumptions of an OLS regression is violated, specifically that the explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated with the error terms.  The reason for this simultaneity can be seen in the theory 
and was discussed above.  Remittances may change child nutrition through affecting household 
time allocation and income constraints.  Conversely child nutrition may change the migration 
decision by affecting the household utility.  Because child nutrition is one of the factors in the 
utility function, it may be that migrating is utility maximizing at certain levels of child nutrition, 
but not at others. This could mean that there will be a difference in child nutrition levels for 
those who do and do not migrate in a way that skews the results.  
 Similar to the literature, I employ an instrumental variable approach in the two stage 
least squares model.  The first stage of this method consists of estimating remittances using an 
instrumental variable.  Then instead of using the remittances directly, the estimates from this 
first stage equation will be used to estimate child nutrition variables.  The variable used to 
instrument remittances was a dichotomous variable indicating whether the mother was 
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originally from the community, as well as the proportion of households surveyed within a 
community received remittances.  This attempted to get at a possible network effect of 
migration which has been used in previous studies (Anton, 2010; Azzarri and Zezza, 2011; 
Mckenzie, 2006).  All of these studies used some variation of the proportion of households 
receiving remittances within a community along with other variables as an instrument for 
remittances.  Whether or not the mother is originally from the community has not been used 
previously, and attempts to measure the extent to which a household is a part of any social 
network that may increase the chances of migration.   
In order to test the quality of the instrumental variable an F-test was run to test for a 
possible weak instrument.  A weak instrument means that the instrument does not adequately 
predict remittances. This would mean that the prediction using the instrumental variable will 
not account for a large proportion of the variation in remittances.  In addition, the results using 
an instrumented variable will be compared to the standard OLS regression to see how much the 
estimations change.  If the coefficient on remittances changes greatly for the regression using an 
instrumented variable this would indicate that there is bias in the OLS results due to 
endogeneity.       
As an alternative, a fixed effects regression will be run using both rounds one and two of 
the survey.  A fixed effects regression will account for all time-invariant unobserved variables.  
Having this fixed effect for the household is only possible when using panel data, that follows 
the same households over multiple years.  As mentioned in the theory section the basic form for 
the regression will be: 
	$%& 
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where 9 is the fixed effect for each household.  This will include all those household level effects 
that are constant over time.  Because of this it is only unobserved variables that affect both child 
nutrition and remittance levels of migration decisions that change over time that can create 
problems of endogeneity.  This would be something such as a health or income change that 
would lead a household to be more or less likely to migrate.  This method of using a fixed effects 
model to capture household level fixed effects is similar to de Brauw and Mu (2011). 
Analysis 
 Because all variables were not available for round one, cross-sectional regressions were 
run using data from round two, one with height-for-age z-scores as the response variable and 
one with weight-for-age z-scores as the response variable.  Using only round two data allowed 
the remittance variable to be a measure of amounts of remittances in thousands of Soles, and 
for regressions to be run using a wealth index or food expenditure.  The results from these 
regressions can be found in tables 6 and 7.  There is not a significant difference in results for 
regressions using the wealth index and food expenditure.  In both cases the coefficient on 
remittance amounts is significant at the 10% level for the results using height-for-age z-score as 
the dependent variable, and insignificant when weight-for-age z-score is used.  This would seem 
to signify that remittances only have an effect on long term nutritional status.  It must be noted 
that the weight-for-age z-score is not available for the twelve year olds in the round two survey.  
As a result, the number of observations is only 1,935 in the regressions using weight-for-age z-
score, as opposed to 2,583 observations in the regressions using height-for-age z-scores.  On all 
of these regressions the p-value for the Breusch Pagan/Cook Weisberg test was significant 
indicating the results have a problem with heteroskedasticity.  In order to solve this regressions 
were run with robust standard errors, which are reported.  
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 In both case the number of parents in the household is also significant and positive at 
the 10% level using height-for-age z-scores after accounting for heteroskedasticity.   The 
estimate of the coefficient on parents in a household is .0705, which is about three times as 
large as the coefficient for an increase in 1000 soles of remittance which was equivalent to $300 
in 2005 when data were collected.  This indicates that to make up for the loss of a parent in 
terms of height-for-age z-scores a household must receive about 3000 soles.  This is roughly 
equivalent to 1000 US dollars, and indicates that this is the level at which the increase in income 
from remittances will make up for the loss of a parent.  Cameron and Lin (2007) also find that 
having fewer parents in the household has a negative effect on child nutrition for their study in 
Thailand, which can be offset by high amounts of remittances, although this result was only 
significant for short term child nutrition as measured by weight for height. 
 These regressions were again run using only those households which received 
remittances.  For the regression using height-for-age as the dependent variable reported in 
table 6 number of parents in the household and remittance amounts were still positive although 
not significantly so.  The coefficient on remittances decreases from the regression using all of 
round 2, while the coefficient on number of parents increases.  Other variables have the same 
sign, although many lose statistical significance, likely due to the lower number of observations 
used in the regression.  For the regression using weight-for-age as the dependent variable 
reported in table 7 both number of parents in the household and remittances are now negative.  
However neither are even one standard deviation away from 0, indicating that there is no effect 
that can be found of remittances or number of parents in the household on height-for-age when 
only using those households which receive remittances.     
 Examining the rest of the regression results, signs of coefficients tend to be as expected. 
An increase in mother’s education or age will result in an increase in height and weight-for-age 
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z-scores.  This variable is a categorical variable, and each increasing level of schooling causes an 
increase in the estimated coefficient.  Significance is compared to a mother having no schooling, 
and every level past primary schooling is significant at the 1% level in all OLS regressions.  de 
Brauw (2011) also found mother’s education to have a significant positive effect on height-for-
age z-scores in El Salvador, while Anton (2010) found mother’s education to have a significant 
positive effect on both weight for height and weight-for-age z-scores.  Living in a rural site as 
opposed to an urban one results in a significant decrease in both height and weight-for-age z-
scores across all OLS regressions.  The estimates indicate a drop in height-for-age z-scores of 
0.311 for children in rural areas compared to those in urban areas in the regression using wealth 
index, and of 0.448 for the regression using food expenditure.  The regression using wealth 
index indicates a drop of 0.217 in weight-for-age z-scores for children in rural areas compared to 
urban, and 0.407 in the regression using food expenditure.  The sign and significance of this 
urban or rural variable is consistent with the previous studies by Anton (2010) in Ecuador and 
Azzarri and Zezza in Tajikistan(2011).   
 One key difference between the regressions is how wealth affects child nutrition 
compared to income.  The coefficient for the wealth index is large and significant, while the 
coefficient for food expenditure is insignificant, and switches signs between the regressions 
using height and weight-for-age z-scores.  This may indicate that the stock concept of wealth is 
more important than the flow concept of income for child nutrition.  This makes sense for a 
more long term health measure such as height-for-age z-score.  However the lack of significance 
for food expenditure may be due to inaccuracies in measurement and calculation.  Food 
expenditure was calculated as the total amount of expenditure and consumption on foods that 
included those produced by the household and those bought by the household for over 30 types 
of foods.  The number of estimations and complexity of calculating this variable may lend itself 
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to some inaccuracies.  If this variable is not measured accurately may misrepresent the 
relationship between expenditure and child nutrition.   
Table 8 separates the parental time variable by gender.  These results indicate that 
having the mother in the household has a larger positive effect on child nutrition than just 
having the father in the household.  This is true for both height and weight-for-age, but only 
statistically significant for height-for-age.  This table also includes regressions with the parental 
time variable interacted with remittances.  For both height and weight-for-age these results that 
remittances have a much larger effect if neither parent is in the household or the mother is not 
in the household.  These results indicate that the gender of the parent that is in the household is 
important for child nutrition, and that having a mother in the household has a much larger 
positive effect on child nutrition than having just the father in the household. 
 Because of possible problems with endogeneity a regression was estimated 
instrumenting remittances using a two stage least squares method.  As stated in the empirical 
section the instrument for remittances was the proportion of households interviewed that 
received remittances and whether the mother was from the community.  This is similar to the 
previous studies that use the network effect to instrument remittances (Anton, 2010; Azzarri 
and Zezza, 2011; Mckenzie, 2006).  One limitation is that this information is only available for 
those households that took part in the Young Lives Survey, so it may not be a completely 
representative sample of how much of the community receives remittances.  The proportion of 
households that receive remittances measures the strength of a network community, while 
whether the mother is from the community measures how much of a connection the household 
might have to others within the community.   
 The results using the instrumental variable are found in tables 9 and 10.  The second 
stage of the instrumented regressions is found in table 10.  The instrumented coefficient for 
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remittances is positive for both height and weight-for-age z-score, but only significant at the 
10% level for weight-for-age z-scores.  After instrumenting for remittances the coefficient for 
remittance amounts (in thousands of Soles) increases.  Even though the instrumented 
coefficient for remittances is no longer significant in the regression for height-for-age z-scores, 
the value of the coefficient increases.  In the regression using weight-for-age as the outcome 
variable the coefficient goes from insignificantly positive in the OLS estimate, to positive and 
significant at the 10% level in the instrumental variable regression.  The actual estimate of the 
coefficient also increases from 0.005 to 0.25.  This indicates that if anything the OLS estimations 
underestimate the effect of remittances on child nutrition. In the instrumented results the 
coefficients for remittance amounts in thousands of Soles are larger than for number of parents, 
indicating that it takes less than 1,000 Soles of remittances to make up for a parent not being in 
the household.  This is much smaller than the roughly 3,000 Soles that were indicated in the OLS 
regressions. 
Other variables within the regression tend to have similar signs and levels of significance 
compared to the OLS regressions.  One variable that is significant in the instrumented 
regressions at the 5% level on the regressions using weight-for-age is the number of parents in 
the household.  This is insignificant, but positive in the OLS regressions on weight-for-age.  For 
all instrumented and OLS regressions using height-for-age z-scores as the response this variable 
is positive and significant at the 10% level.  Similar to the OLS results mother’s age, household 
wealth and mother’s education have a significant positive effect on child nutrition, while living in 
a rural site has a significant negative effect.   
  Table 10 gives the first stage results.  It indicates that there is a significant positive 
relationship between whether the mother is originally from the community and the amount of 
remittances that the household receives.  The proportion of households that receive 
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remittances is also positive, but not significantly so.   The f-statistic for excluded instruments is 
7.62 for weight-for-age z-scores and 8.17 for height-for-age z-scores.  The difference between 
these two values is due to the fact that there are a smaller number of children who have a 
weight-for-age z-score.  This is below the generally accepted value of 10 that indicates a strong 
instrument (Stata 2010).  A Hausman test comparing the instrumental regression to the OLS 
regression gave a p-value of 0.44 using height-for-age as the dependent variable and 0.06 for 
the regression using weight-for-age as the dependent variable.  This gives evidence at the 10% 
level that the instrumented regression removes bias compared to the OLS regression for the 
regressions using weight-for-age.  Given the f-statistics of the first stage regressions and p-
values for the Hausman tests the results using the instrumented variable should be interpreted 
with caution, particularly in the regression using height-for-age z-scores.  In the case of a weak 
instrument the two stage least squares estimate will not remove bias and will cause a loss in 
efficiency. 
In an attempt to use both rounds of data a fixed effects panel regression was run using 
both round 1 and 2.  This method is similar to that used by de Brauw and Mu (2011).  The use of 
a fixed effects regression is also consistent with the result from a Hausman test between fixed 
and random effects, which has a p-value of 0.00 on a test statistic of 109.96.  This indicates that 
the random effects model is inconsistent and fixed effects should be used.   Because of 
limitations caused by the round 1 survey the fixed effects model used a categorical variable for 
remittances that simply indicated whether the household received them.  Although this makes it 
impossible to differentiate between households that receive larger and smaller amounts of 
remittances, it helps to show whether on the whole families that receive some sort of 
remittances are better or worse off than those that do not.  The results from this regression are 
found in Table 11.  The coefficient on remittances shows no significant effect on either height or 
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weight-for-age z-scores and switches signs between the two.  The sign on remittances is positive 
for height-for-age z-score, but negative on the weight-for-age z-score.  The fixed effects panel 
also causes many variables that were insignificant in the cross-sectional panel to be insignificant.  
Two of these variables that were significant in the cross-sectional regressions are not only 
insignificant in the fixed effects regression, but change signs.  This is somewhat surprising 
because the idea that wealth affects child nutrition in a positive way is in line with theory, and as 
mentioned above children from rural areas having lower nutritional outcomes than those from 
urban areas is consistent with previous research (Anton, 2010; Azzarri and Zezza, 2011).  The 
fixed effects regressions give no evidence that migration affects child nutrition one way or the 
other  
Policy Implications    
 There is evidence that migration can effect child nutrition both through time allocation 
and income effects.  This indicates that any policy targeted at improving child nutrition should 
consider effects on both of these factors.  One type of policy that has been tried in the 
developing world, including in Peru, at least in part to improve child nutrition and health are 
conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs.  The program in Peru which is called Juntos was 
started in 2005, and gives monthly payments to households conditional on them having their 
child attend school regularly and receiving various health services(Jones et. al, 2007).  A similar 
program called Progresa in Mexico has been shown to have a positive effect on child health 
(Gertler, 2004).  The results from my paper indicate that in addition to providing households 
with income, CCT programs may be able to positively affect child nutrition by easing household 
income constraints and allowing parents to stay at home who otherwise may have had to 
migrate.  More research should be done to see if current programs are having an effect through 
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household time allocation and if there is a way to structure them in order to maximize any 
positive effects from having parents spend more time with their children 
 Similarly my paper has important implications for those communities where migration 
for remittances is common.  In communities where this is happening it would be important to 
have policies in place to help children where one or more parents is not in the household.  It 
may be that in these communities programs that provide children with health and nutritional 
services outside the home will have the biggest effect.  If many children have parents who are 
out of the household programs run by the government or local schools could be much more cost 
effective than in those  communities where most children have both parents within the 
household.  Given how important both income and time allocation are for child nutrition, it is 
important that any program to address nutrition considers how it will affect both of these 
factors.           
Conclusion 
 It appears that both the added income from remittances and parental time have a 
positive impact on child nutrition, particularly long term child nutrition as proxied by height-for-
age z-score.   The direction of the parental time coefficient is consistent both with theory and 
previous literature (Bronte-Tinkew and Dejong 2004; Cameron and Lin 2007).  Estimates from 
the cross sectional OLS regressions indicate that in order to make up for the loss of a parent a 
house must receive about 3,000 Soles in remittances.  The instrumental variable regressions 
indicate this value is much lower, not even 1,000 Soles. This is also consistent with the previous 
work of Cameron and Lin (2007) which only found a significant impact on nutrition if a 
household received over $200 in remittances.  The results from the cross-sectional OLS and 
instrumented regressions both indicate that if a migrant sends back a significant amount of 
remittances this will have a positive effect on child nutrition.  This is necessary to make up for 
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the loss of a parent, which has a negative effect on child nutrition.  The OLS results estimate that 
$1000 in remittances is necessary to make up for the loss of a parent, while the instrumented 
results estimate this to be much lower, below $300.   
The validity of all results from this paper, including those with an instrument variable, 
depends on the extent to which the problem of endogeneity has been dealt with.  The reason 
for including an instrument for remittances is to deal with this problem.  The results from this 
regression show that remittances have a positive effect on short term child nutrition, which is 
different from the OLS regression that indicates a significant positive effect of remittances on 
long term child nutrition.  For both long and short term child nutrition the difference in point 
estimates between the OLS and instrumented regressions indicate that standard OLS 
underestimates the effect of remittances on child nutrition.  However, diagnostic tests indicate 
that the instrument used is weak, particularly in the case of height-for-age z-scores.  This 
suggests that an improved instrument is needed to adequately deal with endogeneity. 
This does not discount all possible conclusions that can be taken from the results.  There 
is evidence that decreased parental time within the household negatively affects child nutrition 
and remittances can positively affect child nutrition.  There is evidence that migration that does 
not lead to significant or any remittances being sent back to the household would result in lower 
child nutrition.  Given the differing results in this paper and across the literature the effect of 
parental migration on child nutrition may be different from household to household and 
community to community depending on the specific migration experience. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics for Round Two, 5 year olds 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min  Max 
Height-for-age z-score 1950 -1.5 1.12 -5.92 4.53 
Weight-for-age z-score 1955 -0.51 1.03 -4.04 3.83 
Remittance Amounts (Soles) 283 1347.7 4669.52 1 57600 
Wealth Index 1963 0.51 0.23 0.01 0.98 
Monthly Food Expenditure 
(Soles) 1963 211.94 122.66 20 1426 
Monthly Other Expenditure 
(Soles) 1963 149.08 356.18 0 10204 
Mother Age 1955 31.13 6.8 18 53 
 
Neither 
Only 
Dad 
Only 
Mom Both 
 Parents In HH 74 36 409 1,444 
 % 3.77 1.83 20.84 73.56 
 
 
Urban Rural 
   Type of HH 1086 877 
   % 55.32 44.68 
   
 
Yes No 
   Receive Remittances 285 1678 
   % 14.52 85.48       
 
Table 2 - Summary Statistics for Round Two, 12 year olds 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min  Max 
Height-for-age z-score 680 -1.46 1.06 -4.66 2.37 
Remittance Amounts (Soles) 123 919.4 1444.7 20 8400 
Wealth Index 684 0.54 0.22 0.02 1 
Monthly Food Expenditure 
(Soles) 685 228.09 160.79 0 3040 
Monthly Other Expenditure 
(Soles) 685 194.62 731.83 2 17138.3 
Mother Age 660 38.36 6.74 27 59 
 
Neither 
Only 
Dad 
Only 
Mom Both 
 Number of Parents in HH 28 12 199 446 
   4.09 1.75 29.05 65.11 
 
 
Urban Rural 
   Type of HH 414 271 
   % 60.44 39.56 
   
 
Yes No 
   Receive Remittances 124 561 
   % 18.1 81.9       
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Table 3 - Summary Statistics for Round One, 1 year olds 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min  Max 
Height-for-age z-score 2035 -0.78 1.33 -5.52 5.45 
Weight-for-age z-score 2038 -0.09 1.20 -5.47 4.22 
Wealth Index 2047 0.46 0.23 0.01 0.94 
Mother Age 2036 26.83 6.77 14.00 49.00 
 0 1 2   
Number of Parents in HH 12 379 1661   
% 0.58 18.47 80.95   
 Urban Rural    
Type of HH 1357 690    
% 66.29 33.71    
 Yes No    
Receive Remittances 335 1717    
% 16.33 83.67       
 
Table 4 - Summary Statistics for Round One, 8 year olds 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min  Max 
Height-for-age z-score 710 -1.37 1.01 -5.60 2.23 
Weight-for-age z-score 711 -0.47 0.96 -3.87 2.70 
Wealth Index 708 0.51 0.22 0.03 0.93 
Mother Age 678 34.03 6.72 22.00 56.00 
 0 1 2   
Number of Parents in HH 26 175 513   
  3.64 24.51 71.85   
 Urban Rural    
Type of HH 529 185    
% 74.09 25.91    
 Yes No    
Receive Remittances 141 573    
% 19.75 80.25       
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Table 5 - Mother's Schooling by child cohort 
  
Round 2, 5 year 
olds 
Round 2, 12 year 
olds 
Round 1, 1 year 
olds 
Round 1, 8 year 
olds 
 Freq Percent Freq Percent Freq Percent Freq Percent 
None 171 8.77 67 9.84 162 7.96 69 10.22 
Primary 705 36.15 247 36.27 748 36.77 248 36.74 
Secondary 715 36.67 262 38.47 796 39.13 278 41.19 
Some Technical 
College 101 5.18 28 4.11 98 4.82 23 3.41 
Technical College 161 8.26 50 7.34 170 8.36 40 5.93 
Some University 34 1.74 13 1.91 29 1.43 8 1.19 
University 63 3.23 14 2.06 31 1.52 9 1.33 
Total 1,950 100 681 100 2,034 100 675 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Table 6 - Cross Sectional Regressions for Height-for-age z-score 
(i) (ii) (iii)       
Remittances in Thousands of Soles 0.0204* 0.0239** 0.012  
   (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
   Number of Parents 0.0705* 0.0713* 0.090  
   (0.039) (0.039) (0.096) 
   Wealth Index 0.599*** 0.519  
(0.138) (0.375) 
   Food Expenditure in Thousands of Soles -0.002  
   (0.015)  
   Gender (Male=1 Female =2 0.018  0.015  0.040  
   (0.040) (0.040) (0.118) 
   Age in Months 0.0748*** 0.0766*** 0.0575* 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.034) 
   Age Squared -0.000353*** -0.000361*** -0.000286* 
   0.000  0.000  (0.000) 
   Mother age in years 0.002  0.003  0.008  
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) 
   Mother School Primary 0.116  0.145* 0.070  
   (0.081) (0.080) (0.281) 
   Mother School Secondary 0.390*** 0.479*** 0.229  
   (0.087) (0.086) (0.280) 
   Mother School Some Technical College 0.471*** 0.602*** 0.367  
   (0.113) (0.111) (0.325) 
   Mother School Technical College 0.476*** 0.627*** 0.237  
   (0.111) (0.108) (0.328) 
   Mother School Some University 0.600*** 0.748*** 0.778** 
   (0.161) (0.161) (0.382) 
   Mother School University 0.735*** 0.912*** 0.922** 
   (0.157) (0.155) (0.465) 
   Area (Urban=1 Rural=2) -0.311*** -0.448*** -0.630*** 
   (0.055) (0.046) (0.166) 
   Constant -5.159*** -4.845*** -4.451*** 
     (0.491) (0.484) (1.558) 
   Observations 2583 2583 391 
   R-squared 0.176 0.169 0.179 
   Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(i) Regression using Wealth Index and robust standard errors 
(ii) Regression using Food Expenditure and robust standard errors 
(iii) Regression using only households receiving remittances and robust standard errors 
  
29 
 
Table 7 - Cross Sectional Regressions for Weight-for-age z-score 
(i) (ii) (iii)   
Remittances in Thousands of Soles 0.005  0.008  -0.004 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
Number of Parents 0.058  0.057  -0.031 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.097) 
Wealth Index 0.962*** 1.719*** 
(0.142) (0.402) 
Food Expenditure in Thousands of Soles 0.029  
(0.020)  
Gender (Male=1 Female =2 -0.140*** -0.143*** -0.069 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.114) 
Age in Months -0.175* -0.179* -0.494 
(0.100) (0.102) (0.330) 
Age Squared 0.00143* 0.00149* 0.004  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Mother age in years 0.002  0.004  0.002  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
Mother School Primary 0.154** 0.204*** 0.456** 
(0.073) (0.072) (0.231) 
Mother School Secondary 0.411*** 0.549*** 0.647*** 
(0.083) (0.082) (0.241) 
Mother School Some Technical College 0.568*** 0.757*** 0.893*** 
(0.124) (0.123) (0.280) 
Mother School Technical College 0.587*** 0.803*** 0.730** 
(0.109) (0.106) (0.307) 
Mother School Some University 0.720*** 0.939*** 1.464*** 
(0.197) (0.204) (0.356) 
Mother School University 0.836*** 1.085*** 1.269*** 
(0.157) (0.156) (0.443) 
Area (Urban=1 Rural=2) -0.217*** -0.407*** -0.277* 
(0.056) (0.051) (0.159) 
Constant 4.330  4.882  14.090  
  (3.141) (3.179) (10.380) 
Observations 1,935 1,935 276 
R-squared 0.218 0.2 0.318 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(i) Regression using Wealth Index and robust standard errors 
(ii) Regression using Food Expenditure and robust standard errors 
(iii)Regression using only households receiving remittances and robust standard errors 
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Table 8 - Parents separated by gender 
Height-for-
Age Z-score 
Weight-for-
age Z-Score 
Height-for-Age 
Z-Score 
Weight-for-
age Z-Score 
Remittances in Thousands of Soles 0.0212* 0.005 0.0981*** 0.0725*** 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.021) (0.020) 
Parents : Dad Only 0.235 0.048 0.317 -0.010 
(0.229) (0.214) (0.230) (0.208) 
Parents : Mom Only 0.314** 0.139 0.380*** 0.197 
(0.126) (0.123) (0.127) (0.124) 
Parents : Both 0.328*** 0.172 0.393*** 0.224* 
(0.121) (0.118) (0.122) (0.119) 
Remittances * Dad Only -0.105 0.076 
(0.095) (0.089) 
Remittances * Mom Only -0.0818*** -0.0866*** 
(0.027) (0.025) 
Remittances * Both -0.0875*** -0.0759*** 
(0.021) (0.021) 
Wealth Index 0.605*** 0.964*** 0.607*** 0.958*** 
(0.138) (0.142) (0.138) (0.143) 
Gender (Male=1 Female =2 0.017 -0.141*** 0.014 -0.143*** 
(0.040) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) 
Age in Months 0.0746*** -0.178* 0.0754*** -0.175* 
(0.010) (0.100) (0.010) (0.101) 
Age Squared 0.000353*** 0.00146* 0.00036*** 0.00143* 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Mother age in years 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Mother School Primary 0.116 0.152** 0.119 0.152** 
(0.081) (0.073) (0.081) (0.073) 
Mother School Secondary 0.388*** 0.408*** 0.387*** 0.403*** 
(0.087) (0.083) (0.087) (0.083) 
Mother School Some Technical 
College 0.468*** 0.565*** 0.470*** 0.569*** 
(0.112) (0.124) (0.113) (0.125) 
Mother School Technical College 0.473*** 0.583*** 0.472*** 0.587*** 
(0.111) (0.109) (0.111) (0.109) 
Mother School Some University 0.590*** 0.711*** 0.592*** 0.712*** 
(0.161) (0.198) (0.161) (0.199) 
Mother School University 0.737*** 0.833*** 0.740*** 0.839*** 
(0.157) (0.158) (0.157) (0.158) 
Area (Urban=1 Rural=2) -0.306*** -0.216*** -0.303*** -0.216*** 
(0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.057) 
Constant -5.628*** 4.024 -5.729*** 3.869 
(0.476) (3.141) (0.477) (3.147) 
Observations 2583 1,935 2,583 1,935 
R-Squared 0.177  0.219 0.179 0.222 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table 9- First Stage Regression Estimating Remittance Amounts  
 (i) (ii) 
Number of Parents in Household 0.258*** -0.284*** 
 (0.066) (0.079) 
Wealth Index 0.692*** 0.819*** 
 (0.213) (0.275) 
Gender (Male=1 Female=2) -0.098 -0.156* 
 (0.062) (0.081) 
Age 0.001  0.095  
 (0.016) (0.201) 
Age squared 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.002) 
Mother's Age 0.001  0.001  
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Mother School Primary -0.009 0.001  
 (0.120) (0.159) 
Mother School Secondary -0.043 -0.072 
 (0.132) (0.176) 
Mother School Some Technical -0.234 -0.287 
 (0.191) (0.248) 
Mother School Technical College -0.094 -0.207 
 (0.169) (0.221) 
Mother School Some University -0.184 -0.258 
 (0.269) (0.355) 
Mother School University -0.123 -0.160 
 (0.225) (0.287) 
Area (Urban=1 Rural=2) -0.061 -0.115 
 (0.093) (0.125) 
Proportion receive remittances 1.039  1.104  
 (0.721) (0.952) 
Mother from Community 0.258*** 0.326*** 
 (0.066) (0.085) 
Constant -0.223 -2.967 
  (0.872) (6.361) 
Observations 2583  1935  
R-squared 0.024  0.028  
F Value 8.165  7.615  
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
(i) First Stage Height-for-age Z Score   
(ii) First Stage Weight-for-age Z Score 
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Table 10 - Instrumented Regressions  
 
Height-for-age z 
score 
Weight-for-age z 
score 
Instrumented Remittances 0.140  0.250* 
 (0.160) (0.150) 
Number of Parents in Household 0.103* 0.130** 
 (0.060) (0.060) 
Wealth Index 0.521*** 0.771*** 
 (0.170) (0.190) 
Gender (Male=1 Female=2) 0.029  -0.103** 
 (0.040) (0.050) 
Age 0.0744*** -0.207* 
 (0.010) (0.120) 
Age squared -0.000351*** 0.00169* 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Mother's Age 0.002  0.002  
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Mother School Primary 0.119  0.160* 
 (0.080) (0.090) 
Mother School Secondary 0.396*** 0.432*** 
 (0.080) (0.100) 
Mother School Some Technical 0.495*** 0.633*** 
 (0.130) (0.140) 
Mother School Technical College 0.486*** 0.636*** 
 (0.110) (0.130) 
Mother School Some University 0.624*** 0.787*** 
 (0.180) (0.200) 
Mother School University 0.747*** 0.867*** 
 (0.150) (0.160) 
Area (Urban=1 Rural=2) -0.304*** -0.191*** 
 (0.060) (0.070) 
Constant -5.212*** 5.123  
  (0.500) (3.620) 
Observations 2583  1935  
R-squared 0.146  0.037  
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
* The instruments for these equations are proportion 
receiving remittances in community and if mother is 
from the community 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Table 11-Fixed effects panel regression using rounds 1 and 2 
 Regression Coefficients 
Variable Height-for-age Z-Score 
Weight-for-age Z-
Score 
Remittances 0.0124 -0.0213 
 (0.0482) (0.0445) 
Number of Parents 0.0724 0.0575 
 (0.0506) (0.0449) 
Wealth Index -0.0246 0.115 
 (0.165) (0.144) 
Gender (Male=1 Female =2) 2.141* 1.495 
 (1.182) (0.924) 
Age in Months -0.0160*** -0.0420*** 
 (0.0023) -0.00455 
Age Squared 7.51e-05*** 0.000454*** 
 (0.000006) (0.00005) 
Mother age in years -0.0451* -0.00475 
 (0.0258) (0.0248) 
Mother School Primary 0.0702 0.272** 
 (0.143) (0.131) 
Mother School Secondary 0.0574 0.261 
 (0.179) (0.165) 
Mother School Some Technical College 0.0691 0.389** 
 (0.213) (0.196) 
Mother School Technical College -0.00528 0.3 
 (0.224) (0.208) 
Mother School Some University 0.275 0.536** 
 (0.276) (0.253) 
Mother School University 0.137 0.543** 
 (0.283) (0.253) 
Area (Urban=1 Rural=2) 0.0968 -0.033 
 (0.0622) (0.0562) 
Constant -2.785 -2.27 
  (1.881) (1.516) 
Observations 5,252 4,609 
Number of id 2,725 2,707 
R-squared-Within 0.227 0.207 
Between 0.005 0.002 
Overall 0.016 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
Figure A1- Residual verse fitted plot for height-for age cross-sectional OLS 
regression 
 
Figure A2 – Residual verse fitted plot for weight-for-age cross-sectional OLS 
regression 
 
The residual verse fitted plot for the OLS regression using height-for-age as a dependent 
variable is shown in figure A1, and the same plot for the regression with weight-for-age as a 
dependent variable is shown in figure A2.  Both of these plots are a random scatter around 0 
indicating that the residuals and fitted values are uncorrelated with each other which is what is 
expected for a well fitting OLS regression. 
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Figure A3- Residual verse predictor plot for height-for-age cross-sectional OLS regression  
 
Figure A4 –Residual verse predictor plot for weight-for-age cross-sectional OLS regression 
 
Figure A3 shows the residual verse predictor plot for Remittances for the height-for-age cross-
sectional OLS Regression, and figure A4 shows the same thing for the weight-for-age regression.  
Neither of these plots shows a strong correlation between remittances and the residuals. 
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